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The effectiveness of decision making of governments in times of crisis depends largely on their ability to integrate and make sense
of information. Covid-19, for which we currently do not have a cure available, confronts governments with the difficult task of
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errors can distort our thinking process and can lead to negative outcomes. This article proposes that team reflexivity—a
deliberate process of discussing team goals, processes, or outcomes—can function as an antidote to biases and errors in decision
making during a crisis. Prior research has identified several information-processing failures, such as groupthink, where decisions
are made based on a biased sampling of information and the focus is on agreement at all costs. Once a decision is implemented,
there is a tendency for biases and errors to be even more pronounced. The tendency is that people with dissenting opinions or
who present information that threatens the consensus, are often ignored, whipped into agreement or worse. We highlight team
reflexivity as a critical information-processing activity that can improve decision making processes in uncertain times.
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Abstract 12 
The effectiveness of decision making of governments in times of crisis depends largely on their 13 
ability to integrate and make sense of information. Covid-19, for which we currently do not have a 14 
cure available, confronts governments with the difficult task of making decisions in the interest of 15 
public health and safety. Essentially, governments have to react to a threat, of which the extent is 16 
unknown, and they are making decisions in the midst of immense uncertainty. From history we know 17 
that biases and errors can distort our thinking process and can lead to negative outcomes. This article 18 
proposes that team reflexivity—a deliberate process of discussing team goals, processes, or 19 
outcomes—can function as an antidote to biases and errors in decision making during a crisis. Prior 20 
research has identified several information-processing failures, such as groupthink, where decisions 21 
are made based on a biased sampling of information and the focus is on agreement at all costs. Once 22 
a decision is implemented, there is a tendency for biases and errors to be even more pronounced. The 23 
tendency is that people with dissenting opinions or who present information that threatens the 24 
consensus, are often ignored, whipped into agreement or worse. We highlight team reflexivity as a 25 
critical information-processing activity that can improve decision making processes in uncertain 26 
times. 27 
1 Introduction 28 
On January 28th, 1986, people around the world watched in horror, as the Challenger Space Shuttle, 29 
due to a catastrophic mechanical failure only minutes after takeoff, disintegrated, killing all 7 crew 30 
members onboard (Moorhead et al., 1991). Following an investigation, the official report ruled that 31 
the O-rings in the shuttle, which were used to seal up the factory joints, had contained a possibly 32 
catastrophic flaw. This information was given to managers before launch (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989). 33 
However, the reports of this flaw had been downplayed and pushed aside, and the issue was never 34 
resolved. On the day of the disaster, the shuttle launched in subzero temperatures, despite previous 35 
concerns about cold weather potentially increasing the chances of O-ring failures (Moorhead et al., 36 
1991).  Many questions were raised following the disaster about how such a risk could be ignored, 37 
and the investigation which followed cited a culture within the organization which didn’t allow for 38 
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minority or dissenting opinions to be heard (Heimann, 1993). This situation exhibits a classic 39 
example of groupthink, or the tendency for groups to let the desire for harmony or conformity 40 
prevail, resulting in dysfunctional decision-making processes (Janis, 1991, Janis & Mann, 1977).  41 
Groupthink has long been a topic of study, with researchers attempting to understand when 42 
groupthink arises, and in what ways it may undermine a healthy decision-making process (Janis, 43 
1991; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998; for reviews see Park, 1990; Whyte, 1989). In the original model, 44 
Janis (1991) suggested the effects of groupthink would manifest in failure to consider relevant 45 
information and solutions, as well as failures to create contingency plans. The example above showed 46 
the dangers of a faulty decision-making process that led to ignoring vital information, and eventually 47 
resulted in a tragedy, where lives and equipment were lost (cf. Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997). While 48 
not all instances of groupthink may result in such dramatic consequences, it remains a serious, and 49 
potentially deadly pitfall. And even further risking poor outcomes, prior research has shown that we 50 
generally tend to underprepare for disasters (Murata, 2017; Meyer & Kunreuther, 2017). 51 
Prior research has shown that distortions in the decision-making process are very common (cf. 52 
Schippers et al, 2017). Individuals are inherently bad at making decisions, a problem very easily 53 
compounded. Studies have shown that when faced with making decisions in high-stress situations, 54 
humans tend towards using decision-making strategies that rely on habit, becoming less willing to 55 
alter their course of action once they settle on it (Soares et al., 2012). Prior studies have also shown 56 
that time pressures can compound this problem, as high time pressure tends to result in decision 57 
makers relying on strategies they’ve previously used, and not exploring other options fully (Ordóñez 58 
& Benson, 1997). These errors and biases are often magnified in larger decision-making groups, and 59 
the formation of groups adds the possibility of even more team level biases and errors which can 60 
affect decision making processes (Hinsz et al., 1997). 61 
Although it may seem far removed from the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, the covid-19 world 62 
crisis may be at risk of the same decision-making errors. Armed with conflicting information, high 63 
times pressures, and high stakes, decisions during this crisis are clearly being made under suboptimal 64 
conditions. And much like in NASA’s case, biases and errors in decision making may lead to highly 65 
flawed conclusions, and outcomes endangering the lives of the people involved, which in this case is 66 
the entire population. Without a good decision-making process, it may be difficult to achieve positive 67 
outcomes. From prior research findings, we know how information processing failures may be 68 
avoided, and overcome, and researchers have previously suggested that an effective method for doing 69 
so is by fostering a reflexive decision-making process (Schippers et al., 2014). This paper looks at the 70 
dangers of information processing failures such as groupthink, during covid-19 decision-making and 71 
will offer a solution in the form of group reflexivity – a deliberate process of discussing goals, 72 
processes, or outcomes—, as a means of optimizing the process and helping improve the chances of a 73 
positive outcome (Schippers et al, 2014, West, 1996).   74 
2 Information Processing Failures During Crisis 75 
Groupthink is only one type of information-processing failure, but there are many others which can 76 
occur during decision making. An information-processing failure can be defined as “a distortion in 77 
the exchange of, communication about, or elaboration on information due to either an omission error 78 
in information sampling or biased elaboration of the information.” (Schippers et al., 2014, p 733). In 79 
their paper, Schippers et al., also categorized information-processing failures as having three general 80 
forms: (1) a failure to share or discuss relevant information, or, (2) if information is shared, a failure 81 
to examine implications of shared information, or (3) a failure to update or alter prior conclusions. 82 
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An overview of the information-processing failures which fall into these categories can be found in 83 
Figure 1. The aim of this paper is not to redo the previous review by Schippers et al. (2014), on this 84 
topic, but rather the aim is to update and apply it to the covid-19 world crisis. From the perspective of 85 
the Covid-19 crisis, it is imperative to consider the errors and biases which fall into each of these 86 
three categories, and what effect they may have on the decisions made during this time. More 87 
importantly are the development of strategies to avoid these fallacies. 88 
---------------------------------- 89 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 90 
---------------------------------- 91 
Groupthink is an information-processing failure in which group decision making is hindered by the 92 
collective urge to create harmony, and avoid disagreement (Janis, 1991). The effects of groupthink 93 
are that dissenting opinions may go unvoiced or may be pushed aside in favor of keeping the peace 94 
and having agreement and harmony within the group (Janis, 1972; Janis, 1982a; Janis, 1982b; Janis 95 
& Mann, 1977). A study examining groupthink in organizations created a model suggesting 96 
groupthink arises in highly cohesive groups when wishful thinking and reality denial starting at 97 
higher levels of the organization, trickle down and become an integrated part of the decision-making 98 
process (Bénabou, 2013). Oftentimes, those groups develop a tunnel vision to view the problem, and 99 
information not in line with that view is ignored (Janis, 1991). The question is to what extent can we 100 
see this happening in the Covid-19 crisis. Although difficult to judge in an ongoing crisis, there have 101 
been a lot of questions about government responses to the virus, with people questioning why 102 
governments have chosen to ignore certain information, or advice. Most notably, the Chinese 103 
government (Kelly, 2020) and the UK government (Pollock et al., 2020) have been widely criticized 104 
for their misuse of data and information in responding to this crisis, but the problem may be wider 105 
than that. A recent study (Kuhbandner, 2020) suggested that responses to the current crisis are based 106 
on a fundamental statistical fallacy about the spread of the disease. Kuhbandner’s article suggested 107 
that governments were overestimating the rate of disease spread, by not taking into account the effect 108 
of increased testing, and how this may account for seemingly rapid increase in the number of cases. 109 
His results suggested that when controlling for increased testing, the number of reported new cases 110 
had been severely overestimated (Kuhbandner, 2020). Others have noted that the disease has a 111 
similar spread, independent of the measures taken by governments to contain the virus (Ben-Israel, 112 
2020; Ederer, 2020). These results, and the fact that this avenue has been unexplored by most major 113 
governments, suggest a possible fundamental flaw in how information is being processed by 114 
policymakers during this time. While presenting a strong, united front in the face of panic is 115 
important, if governments aren’t considering all options, and allowing for dissenting and conflicting 116 
opinions to be brought forward, then the decision-making process is fundamentally flawed, and will 117 
be hard pressed to come to the best possible outcome (Hart, 1991).  118 
Next to groupthink, a clear risk comes in the form of extensive media and public coverage of the 119 
crisis, which has had a distinct focus on the death toll as a result of the virus. Prior research has 120 
shown that framing a solution in terms of the number of deaths, lead to different decisions than the 121 
when a solution is framed as number of lives saved, even if the outcome is the same (Hameleers, 122 
2020). This specific information processing failure, the framing effect, was first demonstrated by 123 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In their study, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) used the ‘Asian 124 
Disease Problem’, an experimental paradigm used to test how the framing of a problem affected 125 
decisions about possible solutions. In this experiment, participants are given a scenario in which they 126 
are warned about the outbreak of a dangerous disease, expected to kill 600 people. Subjects then had 127 
to decide whether to opt for a risky solution or a certain solution. When participants were presented 128 
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with the risks framed as the number of lives saved, participants preferred to go for the secure 129 
solution. However, when presented with the solution framed as the number of deaths, participants 130 
preferred to go for the risky solution. An overview of this paradigm can be seen in Figure 2. This 131 
study shows that when outcomes focused on the number of lives lost, participants were likely to opt 132 
for solutions which involved larger risks.  133 
---------------------------------- 134 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 135 
---------------------------------- 136 
These results might be highly relevant to the current world situation, where decisions about 137 
responding to the virus need to be made in the face of an overwhelming public focus on the number 138 
of deaths being reported. Recent research suggests that time pressure even further amplifies the 139 
framing effects (Diederich, et al., 2018). That is why the death rate statistics, as mentioned in the 140 
news every day, constitutes a high-risk strategy in terms of weighing information. And while the 141 
effects of the crisis are framed in this way there is a risk that governments will focus on overly risky 142 
solutions, potentially overlooking negative side effects of the solution itself (Kühberger, 1998).   143 
While a focus on minimizing lives lost is not necessarily a bad approach, it is important to understand 144 
that this is not the only negative consequence occurring at this time. Early consideration of the 145 
lockdown measures is already showing many unforeseen negative consequences, such as mental 146 
health, physical health and safety concerns. For instance, in the UK the lockdown has coincided with 147 
domestic violence deaths almost doubling compared to previous years (Grierson, 2020). And 148 
researchers are predicting that extreme lockdown measures may result in skyrocketing suicide rates 149 
over the coming months (Reger et al., 2020). Additional, initial reports show that patients with other 150 
medical conditions are much less likely to receive specialized care during this lockdown, which may 151 
have lasting effects on individuals with other (mental) health concerns (Tam et al., 2020; 152 
Pfefferbaum & North, 2020). The economic impact of this crisis is also a growing concern. 20 153 
million Americans have already filed for unemployment, and initial estimates are suggesting more 154 
than 60 million EU jobs could be at risk (Mutikani, 2020; Riley, 2020). However, researchers have 155 
warned that containing the virus may not be enough to avoid the economic fallout, and policymakers 156 
should be aware of this eventuality (McKibbin & Fernando, 2020). This highlights the fact that in 157 
order to make an informed decision, all these consequences need to be weighed up and considered in 158 
a decision-making process that doesn’t overly focus on a single consequence while ignoring others. 159 
A truly reflexive decision-making process highlights the need for the consideration of a wide range of 160 
solutions, without the formation of a priori judgements.  161 
The Covid-19 crisis is still evolving, with new information continuously being brought to light. In 162 
this constantly developing situation, it will be key that groups remain flexible, and are able to 163 
evaluate and change their course of action if it becomes necessary. Given the uncertain nature of this 164 
situation, it’s understandable that decisions made at any given point may no longer be the best 165 
decision as the situation continues to change (Tolcott, 1989). As new information becomes available, 166 
and more widespread effects of the preventative measures become visible, it’s crucial that 167 
policymakers are able to reflect on the actions they have taken, and when necessary, make 168 
adjustments and changes (cf. Schippers et al, 2014). However, this is more difficult that it seems. A 169 
common bias is escalation of commitment, where people keep investing more resources in a set 170 
course of action, even in the face of clear evidence that the course of action is not working, or that 171 
better options are available (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Dijkstra & Hong, 2019; for a review see 172 
Sleesman et al, 2018). A recent review suggested that an explanation for this phenomenon in groups 173 
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lies in the need to publicly stand by and justify their prior decisions, and that this tendency is 174 
magnified in diverse groups (Sleesman, 2018; Sleesman et al, 2018). However, prior studies have 175 
shown that in order to function effectively, it is key that a group is able to adapt to new information 176 
and circumstances, although the difficulty of their goal is often inversely related with their likelihood 177 
to effectively do so (LePine, 2005). Reflexive decision making is therefore an ongoing process, 178 
where policymakers continuously reassess the situation, and make sure to continue gathering and 179 
weighing all newly arising information. And when new information calls for a change in direction, 180 
this is a step that policymakers need to be prepared for, and willing to take. Importantly, action 181 
should be taken to debias the decision-making process, by means of reflexivity or the use of specific 182 
questions to make sure the decision-making process is as bias free as possible (Schippers et al, 2014; 183 
Brooks et al., 2020) 184 
3 The Role of Reflexivity in Optimizing Decision-making 185 
Reflexivity is most often studied in the context of group decision making and is most often defined 186 
as: “the extent to which group members overtly reflect upon, and communicate about the group’s 187 
objectives, strategies (e.g., decision making) and processes (e.g., communication), and adapt them to 188 
current or anticipated circumstances” (West, 2000, p. 296). Prior research has shown that reflexivity 189 
helps improve team performance (Gabelica et al., 2014; Konradt et al., 2015; Lyubovnikova et al., 190 
2017; Otte et al., 2017; Schippers et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2020) and several review articles have 191 
examined when and why reflexivity is effective (e.g., Konradt et al., 2016; Otte et al., 2018; 192 
Schippers et al., 2014; Schippers et al., 2018; Widmer et al., 2009). A reflexive decision-making 193 
process, where all relevant information is taken into account and weighted, will not guarantee an 194 
optimal outcome, but it does increase the chance that the quality of the decisions made are better. 195 
Thus, it is important to assess how the process leading up to the decisions can be optimized, 196 
especially within groups that are vulnerable to information-processing failures, such as those with 197 
high task complexity (Schippers et al, 2014). 198 
Both the evolution of the disease itself and the long-term economic and mental health impact of this 199 
crisis are uncertain. Although some researchers have attempted to predict how events will unfold 200 
(KcKibbin & Fernando, 2020), it is still too early to understand what the long-term effects will be. 201 
This makes it impossible for policy makers to weigh all the information, because a lot of information 202 
is simply not available at this time. However, working with suboptimal information means that more 203 
than ever there is a need to optimize the decision-making process with the information that is 204 
currently available. Furthermore, reflexivity may offer a method of counteracting incomplete 205 
information, by encouraging the pooling and consideration of information scattered across multiple 206 
group members (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). In a crisis in which considerations come from such a 207 
wide range of topics and fields, this is a key factor in fully understanding all aspects.  Other studies 208 
have shown a wide variety of other factors which are important for fostering reflexivity within 209 
decision making teams. These factors include having transformational leadership of the group 210 
(Schippers et al., 2008), and fostering psychological safety within the group (Edmondson, 1999).  211 
Given the high-pressure nature of the decisions being made during this crisis, it is important to draw 212 
awareness to the dangers of groupthink and encourage differing opinions to be brought forth and 213 
discussed before decisions go forward (cf. De Dreu, 2007). Reflexivity encourages making the 214 
decision-making process an explicit balance of advocacy and inquiry, with a focus on widening the 215 
array of opinions considered, and less on decision-making harmony within the group. As an initial 216 
practical suggestion, using a checklist to ensure the group is avoiding groupthink may offer a simple 217 
solution to navigate around the potentially dangerous groupthink pitfall. In his early work on 218 
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groupthink Janis (1991) offers an overview of observable consequences of groupthink, which forms a 219 
useful basis for symptoms to be aware of, check for, and avoid.  220 
An additional tool to help increase bias free, reflexive decision making is the ‘Five Whys’ technique. 221 
This technique, based on stopping and asking why five times when analyzing a problem, aims to 222 
create a more mindful, complete understanding of the chain between cause and effect (Serrat, 2017). 223 
In Figure 1, we list several biases described here and in Schippers et al (2014) and several ways to 224 
debias the decision-making process. During this crisis large decision-making groups need to make 225 
sure they do not get caught up in treating the surface level symptoms of the crisis, while overlooking 226 
the underlying causes.   227 
4 Conclusion 228 
This paper has aimed to update the findings of Schippers et al. (2014), by adding to and applying the 229 
understanding of information-processing failures to decision-making during the current world crisis. 230 
The risk of biases and errors in decision-making has the potential to cause widespread damages, and 231 
it is of vital importance that policymakers take steps to minimize these effects. Overall, increasing 232 
group reflexivity may offer the key to helping teams optimize their decision making by minimizing 233 
the occurrence and effect of information-processing errors. Although the crisis is already in full 234 
swing, and biases may have already had an impact on decisions made, implementing a reflexive 235 
decision-making process could help policymakers go forward, and allow them to maximize the 236 
chances of good outcomes going forward.  237 
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